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Introduction
The conventional economic theory posits that collusion can be supported by a Nash equilibrium in a game of repeated interaction, provided that each …rm correctly anticipates the strategic response of its rivals. A distinct feature of the economic approach is that it rules out the need for any explicit agreement and instead emphasizes the importance of implicit understanding among …rms to coordinate their behavior so as to achieve pro…ts above competitive levels. By contrast, the law distinguishes collusive behavior only if it is supported by the evidence demonstrating that …rms have concluded an agreement "which ha [s] as [its] object or e¤ect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition ..."
1 Not surprisingly, in almost all cartel cases brought forward by the European Commission it has been found that …rms systematically engaged in express communication, as evidenced by the revealed notes of cartel meetings made by the representatives of these …rms. In attempting to reduce the tension between legal and economic concepts of collusion, the extant literature has primarily focused on the question of why collusive …rms communicate. By contrast, the objective of this paper is to study the question of when they will choose to do so. One reason for raising this issue is that sharing of commercially sensitive information (e.g., customer lists, actual prices, realized sales) commonly requires cartels to develop the means to monitor and verify the reports of their members. For example, the pre-insulated pipe cartel often turned to independent auditors to certify the accuracy of the data being exchanged. 2 In much the same vein, the organic peroxides cartel used the service of AC Treuhand who "acted independently from the cartel members by undertaking and approving the auditing, which was an essential feature of the agreement." 3 Apart from this, cartel meetings often leave traces of evidence of concerted e¤orts to restrict competition and, in such a way, they expose conspirators to the risk of legal prosecution. For these reasons, express communication is not only bene…cial: it also makes collusion less pro…table due to the costs associated with either antitrust enforcement or setting up and maintaining a monitoring scheme. On the other hand, …rms can always avoid paying these costs by colluding tacitly. For instance, many antitrust o¢ cials share the view that if they could achieve a collusive outcome without express communication, then it is unlikely that they would 1 The quotation is part of Article 81 of the Treaty of Rome. 2 "Following the audit (carried out by Swiss accountants), which ascertained the …gures for each producer's 1992 revenue (...), the producers met in Zurich on 18 or 19 August 1993 [...] " §50) 3 Case COMP/E-2/37.857 -Organic Peroxides, §333.
2 ever be accused of wrongdoing because of the lack of incriminating evidence. 4 This however raises the questions of whether collusive …rms should ever use communication and, if they should, how they could minimize the costs associated with doing so. To address these issues, the paper considers a setting similar to Green and Porter (1984) , but modi…es it by giving …rms the opportunity to communicate. Speci…cally, in each period …rms can meet and exchange reliable information about their past output levels before they engage in product market competition. To capture the stylized evidence, the model further assumes that cartel meetings can be uncovered by the competition authority, in which case …rms face …nes and damages claims. As in Green and Porter, the inability of …rms to perfectly detect deviations from the collusive output constraints the scope for collusion. The key di¤erence lies in the fact that they can now deter deviations not only by reverting to a temporary price war but also by verifying the exact amount of goods supplied to the market. Since both ways are expensive, …rms face a nontrivial dilemma in choosing the one which maximizes expected pro…ts.
The main result of the paper is that, with the uniform distribution of the demand shocks used here, the optimal collusive strategy has the following form: …rms meet whenever the market price falls somewhat below a trigger price, and in ‡ict maximal punishment as soon as they detect that some …rm has either deviated from the collusive output or waived the meeting when it should be held. In contrast to Green and Porter, the strategy induces the pattern of collusive behavior in which …rms never revert to a temporary punishment phase. Put it di¤erently, they hold meetings, but the meetings just con…rm the compliance with the collusive agreement. Intuitively, communication, in this setting, has an important deterrence e¤ect: by increasing the likelihood of detection of deviations, it relaxes incentives to deviate. 5 More precisely, given that any detected deviation is sanctioned by a price war, it allows …rms to deter all potential deviations without involving any cost associated with the punishment phase. Another distinct feature of the strategy obtained is that, whenever the market experiences a price decrease, …rms convene to discuss what happens. This result is due to the uniform distribution of the demand shocks which, in particular, implies that the probability for the market price to fall within some range is invariant with respect to marginal changes in total output. In turn, given that the best deviation by a …rm consists in increasing its output, this property implies that, by moving the range of prices triggering communication toward the lower end of the price spectrum, …rms increase the probability of detection of deviations without changing the costs of communication. Consequently, if they ever contemplate communicating, then doing so is most optimal when the price falls somewhat below the trigger price.
There is also some evidence from antitrust practice supporting the predictions of the model. In the Sorbates Case, for example, the Decision of the European Commission states:
"Hoechst and the Japanese producers monitored target price adherence through the data regarding competitor pricing which they used to receive through their dealers. When prices fell below the target prices for key customers, the Japanese companies (mainly Daicel) and Hoechst did on occasions telephone each other to try to ensure that such prices were brought closer into line with the targets in the next large contract with the same customer." 6 The paper also sheds light on the determinants of the frequency of cartel meetings. Overall, the results suggest that conspirators are likely to meet more often as they become less patient, a cartel grows in size, or demand volatility rises. Intuitively, in all these environments they are more tempted to deviate from a cartel agreement, both because they may gain more from increasing their outputs and because they have less to fear that such deviations will be detected. As a result, in order to curb the temptation to deviate, cartels increase the intensity of monitoring.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a brief review of the relevant economic literature. Section 3 outlines the framework for the analysis. Section 4 derives the most pro…table collusive strategy and characterizes the impact of communication on collusion. Section 5 studies the frequency of cartel meetings as a function of various factors that a¤ect the sustainability of collusion. Concluding remarks are given in Section 6. also enhance the e¢ ciency and the sustainability of collusion. The recent theoretical contributions demonstrate how it can serve these purposes.
The paper by Athey and Bagwell (2001) , for instance, touches upon the issue of e¢ ciency. More precisely, it shows that, in order to achieve productive e¢ ciency, …rms exchange private information about their unit costs. By contrast, Compte (1998) and Kandori and Matsushima (1998) explore the issue of sustainability in a setting where each …rm's actions are privately observable and each …rm receives a private and imperfect signal about rivals'play. Both papers demonstrate that the exchange of private information can help sustain collusion, provided that …rms are su¢ ciently patient. 8 In a related study, Harrington and Skrzypacz (2011) address a similar question but in a setting where …rms hold private information about their prices and sales. Assuming that monetary transfers are possible, the authors show that communication constitutes an integral part of the mechanism that ensures the proper functioning of a cartel. The current paper di¤ers from the literature in two respects. First, in all the aforementioned papers it is assumed that communication is costless and the main issue is how to induce truthful reporting. In contrast, in my model …rms cannot distort the reports but rather bear the costs of communication. Accordingly, the emphasis is placed not on truthful reporting (which is guaranteed by the assumption), but on the most e¢ cient use of the limited information.
Second, the paper also di¤ers in the way collusion is uncovered by the competition authorities. The literature typically treats the incriminating evidence as a "black box" or rather it assumes that collusion can be inferred from price observations. Either approach seems of little relevance for policy implications. 9 In contrast, my model builds on the idea that the revealed evidence of communication is the main proof of collusive behavior. Consequently, in such a setting monitoring of prices is sensible insofar it helps to predict when collusive …rms are more likely to communicate. The closest paper to mine is perhaps Martin (2006) who pursues a somewhat similar approach. There are however two important di¤erences. In his model, collusion with communication is an assumption while, in mine, it is derived as part of the optimal collusive strategy. Additionally, in contrast to my approach, he assumes that competition enforcement relies on price observations while abstracting from the nature of the evidence of collusion.
Framework
Consider a setting in which n 2 identical …rms produce a homogeneous good at …xed cost k > 0 and constant marginal cost which is normalized to zero, without loss of generality. Firms engage in repeated Cournot competition over an in…nite time horizon t 2 f0; 1; ::g: Speci…cally, in period t …rm i chooses the quantity q it to supply to the market. Given the total quantity supplied Q t = P n i=1 q it ; the market clears at the price:
where " t is the demand shock realized in period t and a > 0: The shocks are independent across the time and uniformly distributed over the interval [ ; ]: The parameter measures the degree of demand uncertainty and is such that 0 < < a=(n + 1): The latter inequality implies that in competitive equilibrium …rms face a positive market price even if the lowest-demand state is realized.
For a given pro…le of quantities supplied (q 1t ; ::; q nt ); …rm i obtains the expected pro…t: 10 e i (q 1t ; ::; q nt ) = a n j =1 q jt q it k:
If …rms could coordinate their decisions so as to maximize the total industry pro…t, then each of them would produce the quantity q m = arg max q e i (q; ::; q) = a=2n and earn the expected pro…t m = n(q m ) 2 k: In contrast, in the static Nash equilibrium each …rm would produce the quantity q n = a=(n + 1) and earn the expected pro…t n = (q n ) 2 k: Following the approach of Green and Porter (1984) , …rms are assumed to observe only their own output levels and realized market prices. Since the main obstacle for collusion in this setting is the lack of perfect knowledge about each other's behavior, then …rms could only facilitate collusion by exchanging private information about the exact quantities supplied.
11 However, as was discussed in the Introduction, the costs associated with exchanging such information prevent them from systematically doing so. For the sake of exposition, it will be assumed that the costs are due to antitrust enforcement. More precisely, it will be assumed that in every period the competition authority chooses an industry at random and conducts an audit on a regular basis. In case it …nds that …rms have met and exchanged information about the individual output levels, it levies …nes against each …rm participated in the meeting.
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To formalize matters, denote by D fM; N g the set of decision variables (which is common to all …rms) where M means that a …rm proposes to meet and N means that it does not do so. Also, denote by P = [0; a + ] the set of feasible price realizations and by Q = [0; Q] the set of feasible output levels where Q a + :
Repeated interaction between …rms is modeled as an in…nitely repeated game G 1 ( ) de…ned by the component game G and the common discount factor 2 (0; 1):
The one-period game G in turn is de…ned as follows:
After all the decisions having been made, they become commonly known. The meeting takes place only if all …rm agree on this, i.e., only if d i = M for all i: In which case, they disclose private information about the exact outputs produced in the past. If the meeting does not take place, neither …rm can access private information about the rivals'output levels.
Stage 2. Each …rm i produces an output q i 2 Q; the shock " is realized, and the market price p 2 P becomes publicly observable.
Stage 3. The competition authority audits the industry. If the meeting has taken place, it detects the meeting with the probability 2 (0; 1) and levies the …xed …ne F against each …rm attended the meeting. 13 Otherwise, it …nds no evidence of collusion and levies no …nes. Stage 4. The pro…ts are obtained.
The timing of the game G thus implies that, upon entering every single period, each …rm observes the history of its own output levels, the realized market prices, the rivals' decisions regarding the meetings and the rivals' output levels disclosed during the meetings. Denote by I f?g [ Q n 1 the information set available to each …rm in each period t 1 which represents its knowledge of the rivals' output levels produced in period t 1; the sign ? means that a …rm lacks any relevant information.
14 Denote also by
I t 1 P t 1 the history up to date t 1 and by H 0 the null history. A strategy i for each …rm i speci…es a sequence 1 2 The model thus abstracts from any reason to communicate other than facilitate collusion. 1 3 In general, the …ne F can vary with the total output Q: For example, it can be proportional to the damage caused to consumers. Alternatively, it can be associated with the foregone pro…ts from the breakdown of collusion for a number of periods. The implicit assumption here is that …rms neglect the relationship between Q and F because, say, it might be di¢ cult to predict the judgement of court. An explicit account for a functional relationship between Q and F is the subject for future research.
1 4 Note that I f?g at t = 0 since there is nothing to disclose yet. 
where
Following the approach of Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994) , the paper will consider those sequential equilibria in which in every single period …rms condition their play on the history of the commonly observed variables only. Such strategies are called public strategies and such sequential equilibria are called perfect public equilibria. Furthermore, the analysis will focus on fully symmetric perfect public equilibria in which …rms use the same continuation strategy, i.e., it = t for all i:
Denote by = ( ; :::; ) (respectively, by = ( ; :::; )) the equilibrium strategy pro…le which yields the maximal payo¤ V (respectively, the minimal payo¤ V ) in the game G 1 ( ): De…ne the outcome path
t=0 generated by where q M t and q N t are the outputs produced by each …rm in period t; given that in this period the meeting has and has not been held, respectively. The outcome path Z generated by can be de…ned in a similar way.
Denote by e (z; q) the expected pro…t of …rm i; by p e q (z) the expected market price and by P q (z) the set of prices that can occur with positive probability in the case where …rm i produces the quantity z while each other …rm j produces the quantity q; i.e., e (z; q) = e i (z; q; ::; q); p e q (z) = a z (n 1)q;
Let e (q) e (q; q); p e q p e q (q) and P q P q (q): It is straightforward to verify that e (q) ? e (z; q) for any z 7 q < q n : This property will be used repeatedly in the subsequent analysis. Note that in the present setting communication can enhance collusion in two respects.
First, it can allow …rms to sustain harsher punishments. In which case, even 1 5 The subscript ' i'denotes the vector of the decision variables chosen by all …rms except …rm i:
if it does occur along the equilibrium path, yet it can make collusion easier to sustain.
Second, it can allow …rms to better detect deviations from the collusive output. In which case, it can facilitate collusion even if in the punishment phase …rms abandon it for whatever reasons.
Since the goal of the paper is to examine the second e¤ect, the exact value of the punishment is not important. For this reason, a technical assumption is made.
It states that the static Nash equilibrium yields zero pro…ts. Given that the minmax payo¤ is also zero, this implies that the strategy takes a particularly simple form: in each period produce q n and propose no communication whatsoever. As a result, one can restrict attention to those equilibria in which in each period …rms produce less than q n :
4 Optimal collusive strategy
Since at t = 0 there is nothing to reveal yet, while meeting is costly, the optimal collusive strategy must specify no meeting at t = 0: As Appendix A shows, it must also specify that in each period …rms produce the same output q regardless of the meeting, i.e.,; p]; which is the same for all periods. Furthermore, in case they detect any deviation from q or in case some …rm waives the meeting when it must be held, it requires …rms to switch to the worst sustainable punishment. Formally, the strategy is of the form:
In period t = 0 propose no meeting and produce q;
In each period t 1 proceed as follows:
; then propose no meeting and produce q;
; p]; then propose to meet; if the meeting has taken place and it has revealed that each …rm produced q in period t 1; then produce q; otherwise produce q n and play from the next period onwards;
; p e q + ]; then play from this period onwards.
The strategy is thus characterized by the collusive output q and the trigger price p: Speci…cally, q determines both the value of the collusive pro…t e (q) and the set of prices P q = [p e q ; p e q + ] that can occur with positive probability along the equilibrium path, while p determines the set of prices [p e q
; p] that trigger the need for a meeting.
Denote by the probability for …rms to meet in each period t 1; i.e.,
Since, for a given q; there is one-to-one relationship between p and ; in what follows the equilibrium will be characterized in terms of ( ; q) rather than (p; q) :
Consider the outcome path Z induced by the strategy pro…le and choose some period t in which …rms are supposed to meet. Denote by V M t the average discounted value of the stream of the expected payo¤s generated by Z from period t onwards. For period t 0 in which …rms are not supposed to meet, de…ne V N t 0 in a similar way. Since the strategy is stationary, then
In which case, it is straightforward to verify that V N and V M are related as follows:
where F e F: Solving the above system of equations yields:
For to be an equilibrium strategy, it must be immune to all possible deviations. Consider …rst deviations in which a …rm defects from the collusive output. Note that, if = 1; then all such deviations will systematically be detected while, if < 1; then some of them will likely to pass unnoticed. Given this, it will prove useful to distinguish between open and hidden deviations.
In the open deviation a …rm clearly reveals that it has cheated. Since cheating can be revealed either by the price realization or by the meeting, it will certainly be detected if it induces zero probability for the realized price to fall within the set of prices, (p; p (
Substituting (2) into (4) and rearranging the terms yields:
where z is such that either p
In contrast, in the hidden deviation a …rm seeks to reduce the likelihood of detection of cheating. Towards that end, it produces the output z 6 = q such that, with some positive probability, the realized price will fall within the interval (p; p p while the latter implies that 0 < q z 2 : In either case, z must di¤er only marginally from q:
Denote by (z) the probability for any such deviation to be detected, i.e., (z) = Prfp = 2 (p; p e q + ]g: It is straightforward to verify that, if p e q (z) p e q < 2 ; then:
while, if p < p e q (z) + ; then:
Since all detected deviation are followed by the worst sustainable punishment, the hidden deviation will be unpro…table only if:
which, in particular, implies:
Note that, since (z) and e (z; q) < e (q) for all z < q(< q n ); the above condition is trivially satis…ed for all z < q: Thus, in considering (7) it su¢ ces to restrict attention to z > q: In which case, substituting (2) and (3) into (7) and rearranging the terms yields:
where z is such that 0 < z q < p e q + p and (z) is given by (6) : For given ; (5) and (8) characterize the set of collusive outputs that can be sustained in equilibrium. Although these conditions are formally de…ned for di¤erent z; one can neglect this di¤erence while considering them simultaneously. The intuition suggests (and it is proven in Appendix A) that, of the two conditions, (5) is stronger for large output deviations, while the reverse holds for marginal ones. In other words, (5) and (8) are compatible for z q: Thus, taken together, they can be written as:
where (z) is given by (6) : Conditions (OD) and (HD) have simple interpretation: the short-term gain from deviating from the collusive output q must not exceed the expected loss from abandoning collusion forever afterwards. In this setting, the gains from deviating are twofold. First, given that in Cournot competition outputs act as strategic substitutes, a deviator may gain from increasing its output level. In this respect, (OD) ensures that q is immune to all open deviations while (HD) ensures that it is immune to all hidden ones. In the former case, a …rm best responds to q while, in the latter, it suboptimally increases its output, so that when market demand is high the price mimics a somewhat lower demand state.
Second, given that any detected deviation causes a breakdown of collusion, a deviator may gain from saving on the cost of communication necessarily borne in the collusive phase. More precisely, it then avoids paying F e in all subsequent periods which adds up to saving the amount F e =(1 ): This is possible because of the particular form of the punishment considered here, namely, a reversal to the static Nash equilibrium. Although it yields zero payo¤, it involves no communication whatsoever.
Consider now the deviation in which a …rm waives the meeting when it must be held. Since it is always revealed before …rms set their output levels, it can be more immediately punished. But even though …rms respond to it by playing the static Nash equilibrium, still it may be pro…table because it allows the deviator to save on the cost of communication. Thus, each …rm will refrain from waiving the meeting only if:
which yields (using (2) and (3)):
where > 0:
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Note that, by using (2) ; (3) ; (6) and p e q p e q (z) = z q; (HD) can be written as:
Since the left hand side of the above condition is always non-negative, (WM) is satis…ed whenever (9) is satis…ed. Thus, it can be omitted in the subsequent analysis.
Conditions (OD) and (HD) are necessary for the existence of equilibrium in which …rms maintain their outputs at the level of q; and hold meetings on occasion. Appendix A shows that these conditions are also su¢ cient. This leads to:
Proposition 1 The strategy ( ; q) is the optimal collusive strategy wherein ( ; q) solves the following problem: 
Proof. See Appendix A.
The result has two sides to it: …rst, …rms hold meetings only when the market price falls somewhat below the trigger price and, second, they never revert to a temporary punishment phase. The …rst feature is similar to the pattern of collusive behavior obtained in Green and Porter (1984) in the sense that, in both models, …rms have to take costly action when the market experiences a price decrease. More precisely, in Green and Porter they revert to a temporary price war while here they engage in costly communication. In either case, though the …rms' reactions are di¤erent, they aim to deter potential deviations from the collusive output.
To gain the intuition for why …rms …nd it optimal to apply a "tail-type" test in choosing whether to meet, suppose instead that they choose to do so when the price falls within the interval 
Consider a deviation in which a …rm marginally increases its output z: Assuming that z is such that p 0 < p e q (z) + < p 0 ; the probability of detection of such deviation would be given by:
In the above expression, the …rst term captures the probability that the deviation will be revealed during the meeting while the second one captures the probability that it will be revealed by the price realization. Note that 0 depends only on the di¤erence As a result, with the tail-type rule applied to the range of admissible price realizations P q ; …rms can do at least as well as with any other rule determining when they must hold a meeting. The second feature of the collusive strategy obtained here contrasts with the pattern of collusive behavior obtained in Green and Porter. In their setting, communication is not allowed and deviations can never be detected. Consequently, occasional reversions to a price war are needed in order to deter potential deviations. By contrast, in the present setting …rms are given the opportunity to communicate which induces a positive probability for any deviation to be detected. 18 Furthermore, since all detected deviations are most severely punished, the threat of triggering the punishment phase su¢ ces to remove any temptation to deviate. As a result, along the equilibrium path …rms maintain the agreed output levels and the meetings just con…rm adherence to this agreement.
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To better understand how communication facilitates collusion, it will prove useful to consider the situation where …rms are not allowed to communicate.
Benchmark: tacit collusion. Denote by b the best collusive strategy in this case. Note that the strategy b can be obtained by using the previous analysis. Speci…cally, it can be regarded as the strategy which speci…es no meetings along the equilibrium path. As a result, b takes a particularly simple form: "produce b q as long as p 2 P b q ; otherwise produce q n forever afterwards".
To establish the equilibrium conditions, suppose that all …rms adopt the strategy (b ; b q) wherein b = 0: Since, by construction, no meeting is ever held, condition (WM) is irrelevant. Next, condition (OD) takes the form that looks like the one obtained in the standard deterministic models, i.e.,
The probability of detection of deviations (which are now revealed only if the realized price falls outside the target set of prices P b q ) is equal to:
Using the above expression and b = 0; (HD) can be written as:
where z is such that 0 z b q 2 : The above condition implies that all marginal deviations will be deterred only if:
As before, it can be shown that conditions (OD tc ) and (HD tc ) (where superscript means tacit collusion) are necessary and su¢ cient for b to be an equilibrium strategy. This leads to:
Proposition 2 The strategy b (b q) is the optimal collusive strategy without communication wherein b q solves the following problem:
s:t: (OD tc ) and (HD tc ) hold.
The proof follows the same steps as for Proposition 1 and, hence, it is omitted.
Denote by b q o (respectively, by b q h ) the lowest quantity for which (OD tc ) (respectively, (HD tc )) is binding. The following proposition establishes the key features of the strategy b .
Proposition 3 Suppose that collusive …rms do not communicate and punish all detected deviations by a reversal to the static Nash equilibrium forever. Then: (i) There exists a threshold b min 2 (0; 1) such that they can sustain collusion if and only if b min ;
(ii) There exist b 1 and b 2 such that b min < b 1 b 2 < 1 and b q is given by:
Proof. See Appendix B:
The proposition, in particular, implies that it is always the hidden deviations that do not allow …rms to collude when they are su¢ ciently impatient. Intuitively, in the open deviation a …rm optimally responds to the collusive output. This yields a large one-period gain but induces the retaliation for sure. In contrast, in the hidden deviation a …rm only suboptimally responds to the collusive output. This in turn yields a lower one-period gain but induces the likelihood for such a deviation to pass unnoticed. When the discount factor is small enough, the gains are almost the same. 20 As a result, the hidden deviations are more pro…table in this case.
Another noteworthy feature of the proposition is that the open deviations can impede tacit collusion only for moderate values of the discount factor and only when the variance of the demand shocks is su¢ ciently small. This is again quite intuitive: a less uncertain environment increases the probability of detection of the hidden deviations and thereby makes them less pro…table in compared to the open ones.
Communication as facilitating device. One can now characterize the impact of communication on collusion. To begin, suppose that the scope for tacit collusion is limited by the open deviations (i.e., b q = b q o ): In which case, even if …rms could communicate, they would optimally refrain from doing so.
21 This is because the most 2 0 When the scope for collusion is too limited, even the optimal response involves only a slight modi…cation of the collusive output.
2 1 Note that (OD) is stronger than (OD tc ) for any > 0; while both conditions are equivalent for = 0: Hence, e (q) e (b qo) for any ( ; q) satisfying (OD) which a fortiori implies that e (q)
F e e (b qo):
pro…table deviations are those which are already detected with probability one. Accordingly, as long as such deviations are deterred, each …rm correctly anticipates that its fellow members will comply with the collusive agreement. This makes communication useless. Consequently, it does not pay for …rms to bear the cost of the meetings. The analysis thus implies that it is only when the scope for tacit collusion is limited by the hidden deviations that …rms can bene…t from communication. Speci…cally, we have:
Proposition 4 Suppose that the solution to (P2) is such that (HD tc ) is binding. Then:
(i) There exists a threshold of the legal penalty F such that the strategy yields a larger expected payo¤ than the strategy b does whenever F e F ; and it yields a lower expected payo¤ otherwise; (ii) F m and F is an increasing function of ; provided that is large enough and n 12:
The proposition thus implies that when the hidden deviations constrain …rms from making collusive pro…ts, communication enables them to further enhance these pro…ts, even though it involves the risk of exposure to legal sanctions. Note that the proposition does not require the legal penalty to be small, rather it su¢ ces that it does not exceed a certain level which tends to increase as demand volatility rises. This is quite intuitive: a more noisy environment renders deviations more pro…table which requires …rms to meet more often in order to stabilize the cartel. Consequently, a larger penalty is needed to prevent them from doing so. In particular, as the proposition shows, the penalty can even exceed the level of the monopoly pro…t when demand uncertainty is large enough.
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Since the meetings aim to monitor adherence to the collusive strategy, they reduce the scope for deviations and thereby allow …rms to further restrict their outputs (i.e., to sustain q lower than b q h ): However, in choosing the frequency of meetings, ; they face a trade-o¤ between additional pro…ts to be gained from an increase in the intensity of monitoring and the increased risk that collusion might then be uncovered by the competition authority. On balance, communication will improve collusive pro…ts only if:
The above condition is readily satis…ed for F e small enough. Indeed, as Proposition 3 implies, (OD tc ) must necessarily be slack for b q = b q h : Since the functions e (q) and 2 2 Arguably, this is due to the implicit assumption that …rms are not liquidity constrained. 
One can verify that when F e < inffF : 2 tc h g there always exists an equilibrium in which …rms meet in every period (i.e., set = 1) and maintain their outputs at the level of q : By construction, in this equilibrium each …rm obtains the expected payo¤ e (q ) F e > e (b q h ): Thus, the issue is how much F e needs to be small in order for explicit collusion to be more pro…table.
In particular, if b q h is such that e (b q h ) (1 )F e > 0; then in explicit collusion …rms can obtain more than e (b q h ) by reducing their outputs just slightly below b q h and inducing a small probability of communication. To show this, let q < b q h and be given by:
It su¢ ces to establish that the outcome ( ; q) ; as de…ned above, is sustainable.
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Note …rst that, for given by (10) ; the opportunity cost of waiving the meeting is equal to:
which ensures that (WM) is always satis…ed. Next, since (OD tc ) is not binding for
OD) must be satis…ed for su¢ ciently small and q slightly lower than b q: Finally, using (6) and V N = e (q) F e = e (b q h ); (HD) can be written as:
Note that, since q > q m ; then @ =@q = ( F e ) 1 @ e (q)=@q < 0: Moreover, since (HD tc ) is binding for b q = b q h ; the following conditions must also hold:
Taken together, the above conditions imply that (11) must be satis…ed for some q slightly lower than b q h : In contrast, if b q h is such that e (b q h ) (1 )F e 0; then, in order for explicit collusion to be more pro…table, …rms must considerably reduce their output levels. The analysis is more involved, since not only (HD) but also (OD) must then be treated carefully. As Appendix C shows, even in this case, with communication …rms are able to achieve greater collusive pro…ts, provided that the legal penalty does not exceed the level of F :
Consider now the other side of Proposition 3, viz. the inability of …rms to sustain tacit collusion for low values of the discount factor, i.e., for < b min : As was explained above, this is because for those discount factors they are unable to deter the hidden deviations. Note however that (HD tc ) is binding for = b min : In which case, Proposition 4 implies that …rms could instead sustain explicit collusion, provided that F e F : Furthermore, given that conditions (OD) and (HD) are continuous with respect to ; this must also hold true for some < b min but close enough to b min : The following proposition con…rms the intuition.
Proposition 5 Suppose that F e < F : Then, there exists a threshold min 2 (0; b min ) such that explicit collusion is sustainable if and only if min :
Proof. See Appendix D:
The proposition thus implies that, even though communication can help restore the scope for collusion in markets where collusion would not be sustainable otherwise, yet it cannot make collusion sustainable when …rms are too impatient.
To gain the intuition behind the result obtained, it is useful to distinguish between the deterrence e¤ect and the value diminishing e¤ect of communication. In the …rst case, communication reduces the incentives to deviate by increasing the probability of detection of deviations while, in the second case, it reduces the value of collusion by exposing …rms to the risk of legal punishment. It turns out that, even though the …rst e¤ect relaxes the incentive constraints and thereby enlarges the scope for collusion, yet the second e¤ect renders collusion unpro…table when the discount factor is small enough.
Frequency of meetings
Although the importance of communication in collusion was recognized long ago, the literature has somehow neglected a number of related issues. How often do …rms communicate? Which factors, if any, can in ‡uence the frequency of communication? Does it depend on matters to be discussed? This section aims to provide insights into these questions. However, since a closed form solution to problem (P1) cannot be explicitly derived, it is not possible to determine analytically how it varies with the parameters ; ; F e and n: For this reason, simulations are performed for particular values of these parameters.
Since is the probability for …rms to meet in every single period, it is natural to consider it as a measure of the frequency of the meetings (the inverse of is then the mean time between two consecutive meetings). Figure 1 displays the graphs of as a function of calculated for di¤erent values of n while holding and F e …xed. Figure   2 displays the graphs of the same function calculated for di¤erent values of while holding n and F e …xed.
[Insert Figures 1 and 2]
In the …gures, each graph is drawn on the interval [ min ; ] where is the minimal discount factor for which collusive …rms are able to sustain the fully integrated monopoly outcome without communication. In each case, the parameter has been chosen such that the sustainability of tacit collusion be constrained by the hidden deviations only, i.e., > (n 1)=16n; as implied by Proposition 3.
From inspection of Figure 1 it follows that, as n increases, the graph of shifts rightward and min becomes larger. This suggests that the conventional view (often justi…ed in terms of a Nash equilibrium in an in…nitely repeated game in which communication is per se irrelevant) that collusion is easier to sustain the fewer …rms are in the market seems to hold even when they engage in meaningful communication. In addition, the …gure also shows that in the interval of 's where all the functions are well de…ned (e.g., in the interval from 0:70 to 0:81) tends to increase, as n rises. Put it di¤erently, …rms tend to communicate more often, as a cartel grows in size. Intuitively, in this case each …rm obtains a lower market share and therefore it is more tempted to deviate by marginally increasing its output. As a result, in order to discipline its members, a cartel increases the intensity of monitoring.
Another noteworthy feature of Figures 1 and 2 is that the function is nonmonotonic: it increases in the neighborhood of min and decreases otherwise. The increasing part of might be explained as follows. For the chosen values of the parameters F e and it is the hidden deviations that impede collusion when is close enough to min : In this case, …rms can sustain collusion only by means of monitoring of their private actions. As a result, they increase the frequency of meetings despite the fact that doing so diminishes collusive pro…ts. 25 In contrast, when is large enough, they are less tempted to deviate which allows a cartel to reduce the intensity of monitoring. This in turn explains the decreasing part of : Lastly, Figure 2 suggests that is an increasing function of the variance of the demand shock : This again seems quite intuitive. A more noisy environment increases the scope for deviations which makes collusion more di¢ cult to sustain. Consequently, in order to enhance the sustainability collusion, more communication and more monitoring are required.
Concluding remarks
The paper argues that in a situation where the threat of legal prosecution constrains collusive …rms from meeting too often, they choose to do so only if the market price falls somewhat below the target price. By using occasional meetings most e¢ ciently, …rms are still able to collude in a better way. More precisely, when collusion is already somewhat e¤ective, the meetings allow …rms to achieve greater collusive pro…ts. Furthermore, they allow …rms to restore the scope for collusion in markets where collusion would not be sustainable otherwise.
The paper also sheds light on the relationship between the frequency of meetings and changes in market environment. In this regard, it delivers important implications for more e¢ cient cartel detection. Speci…cally, the results suggest that the competition authorities should take into account that cartel participants tend to meet more often in markets where they value future experiences to a lesser degree, they face greater uncertainty or where cartels are bigger in size.
The model builds on the assumption that the probability distribution of the demand shocks is uniform. As a result, the optimal collusive strategy, in this setting, requires …rms to apply a tail-type test in choosing whether to meet. Related to alternative speci…cations of uncertainty, my conjecture is that a similar strategy should also be optimal for at least those probability distribution functions that satisfy the condition that low prices are more likely to result from a large total output rather than a small one.
The other simplifying assumption is that the competition authority just blindly …ghts collusion, i.e., it makes no use of either the actual level or the dynamics of prices. Such an approach rules out any strategic interaction between …rms and the competition authority. An explicit account for this in a dynamic context is a challenging task, and it is left for future research.
Appendix

A. Proof of Proposition 1
Consider equilibria in which …rms condition their play only on the history of commonly observed variables, i.e., market prices, decisions to meet and each other's output levels disclosed during the meetings. Next, consider a history along the equilibrium path leading to a period in which each …rm is required to produce the output q: Given that " is drawn from a bounded support, …rms expect the realized price to fall within the interval P q : If instead it falls outside this interval, they infer with probability one that cheating has occurred. But since the …rm that has deviated can condition its continuation strategy on its output z 6 = q; the other …rms need to make conjectures about its unobservable action. Moreover, since there is a possibility that they disagree on or form incorrect beliefs about z; in the continuation game they can obtain the payo¤s which are even lower than the ones that they would obtain in the worst sequential equilibrium.
To avoid technical di¢ culties related to speci…cation of beliefs in the event of unexpected price realization, in what follows only those strategies which require …rms to revert forever to the static Nash equilibrium after the realization of any p = 2 P q will be considered. This guarantees that the continuation-strategy pro…le is always an equilibrium and therefore the methodology of Abreu et al. (1986 Abreu et al. ( , 1990 ) can be applied.
Denote by V M (respectively, by V N ) the set of expected payo¤s generated by the equilibrium strategies which necessarily require …rms to meet (respectively, not to meet) at period t = 0: Note that V N 6 = ? because playing the static Nash equilibrium in every period constitutes a Nash equilibrium in the game G 1 ( ): Note also that V M 6 = ? for F e = 0 because communication enables …rms to replace an imperfectmonitoring setting with a perfect-monitoring one. In which case, an equilibrium always exists. Hence, V M 6 = ? at least for su¢ ciently small values of F e : Finally, since meeting
Following Abreu et al. (1986 Abreu et al. ( , 1990 , any equilibrium strategy can be factored into the stage decision variables d 2 D and q 2 Q; and the corresponding continuation payo¤ functions v(d) and V (p): The function v(d) 2 V N ensures that a …rm will never gain from waiving the meeting while the function V (p) 2 V N ensures that it will never gain from deviating from the collusive output. Consider a period on the equilibrium path in which …rms are required to produce the output q each. Note …rst that V (p) = 0 for all p = 2 P q because the static Nash 23 equilibrium yields zero payo¤. Next, denote by P M P q the set of prices that trigger the need for a meeting. Since, by assumption, the meeting will reveal the exact output produced by each …rm, the …rm's continuation payo¤ must also depend on whether it has defected from q or not. Accordingly, denote by V M dev (p) 2 V N its continuation payo¤ in case it has done so, and by V M (p) 2 V M its continuation payo¤ in case it has not. Likewise, denote by P N P q nP M the set of prices triggering no communication,
and by V N (p) 2 V N the …rm's continuation payo¤ in this case. It is implied that
Consider now a deviation in which a …rm produces an output z 6 = q: Since, by doing so, it induces the set of feasible price realizations P q (z) 6 = P q ; in what follows it will prove useful to de…ne the set O q (z) P q (z) \ P q : By construction, O q (z) is the set of prices that can occur with positive probability regardless of whether the …rm has deviated or not. As for detection of deviations, three cases need to be distinguished.
In the …rst case, p 2 P q (z)nO q (z): Since P q \ P q (z)nO q (z) = ?; this implies that p = 2 P q : In other words, the deviation will be revealed by the price realization. In the second case, p 2 P q (z) \ P M which implies that the deviation will be revealed during the meeting if the …rm chooses to attend it; otherwise, it will be revealed by its refusal to do so. In the third case, p 2 P q (z) \ P N which implies that the deviation will pass undetected. From the above discussion it follows that, if q is produced in some period on the equilibrium path, it must satisfy:
for all z 2 Q: Consider now a period on the equilibrium path in which …rms are …rst required to meet and then produce the output q each. Given that a …rm's refusal to meet is commonly known, the other …rms can respond immediately to such deviation by modifying their output levels. Denote by v 2 V N the continuation payo¤ of a …rm that refuses to attend the meeting when it must be held. Thus, it will never gain from doing so only if:
Note that, without loss of generality, the set P M can be represented by collection 
Also, de…ne the indicator function:
Denote by (P M ) E[p 2 P M ] the probability for …rms to meet in the following period. Using the expressions for k and k ; one can show:
Denote by (zjP M ) the probability of detection of the deviation in which a …rm produces an output z 6 = q; i.e.,
Depending on the value of z; two cases need to be distinguished. In the …rst case, z is such that p e q p e q (z) > 2 : This condition implies that O q (z) = ? and, therefore, (zjP M ) = 1; i.e., the deviation will be detected for sure. In the second case, z is such that p e q p e q (z) 2 : This condition in turn implies that O q (z) 6 = ? and, therefore, the deviation will be detected only with some positive probability. In particular, one can verify that, if 0 < p e q (z) p e q 2 ; then:
while, if 0 < p e q p e q (z) 2 ; then:
Proof. Note …rst that (A3) implies that (P M ) < 1 and:
for any k 1: The conclusion thus follows immediately if p e q p e q (z) > 2 ; since in this case (zjP M ) = 1:
some k 1 and using (A4) and (A6), we have:
Supposing instead that p e q (z) 2 [p k ; p k ] for some k 1 and proceeding in a similar way, we have:
Finally, consider the case 0 < p e q p e q (z) 2 : Supposing that p e q (z) + 2 (p k 1 ; p k ) for some k 1 and using (A5) and (A7), we have:
Supposing instead that p e q (z) + 2 [p k ; p k ] for some k 1 and proceeding in a similar way, we have:
This completes the proof.
Denote by V M the greatest element of V M and by M = ( M ; :::; M ) the strategy pro…le generating V M : Likewise, denote by V N the greatest element of V N and by N = ( N ; :::; N ) the strategy pro…le generating V N : Note also that the lowest element of V N is generated by the strategy pro…le = ( ; :::; ) which involves playing the static Nash equilibrium in every period.
Lemma A2. If in some period on the equilibrium path …rms meet and produce the output q each, then q must satisfy the following two conditions:
and
for all z 2 Q:
Proof. By supposition, q satis…es (A1) and (A2). First, consider (A2). Using
we have:
Taken together, (A10) and v 0 imply that (A8) is satis…ed whenever (A2) is satis…ed.
Consider now (A1). Note that it can be written as:
Depending on the value of z; it will prove useful to distinguish three cases.
Case 1. z is such that p e q p e q (z) > 2 : This condition implies that O q (z) = ? and therefore P q (z) \ P M = P q (z) \ P N = ?: Substituting the latter conditions 27 into the right hand side of (A11) and using (A10) yields:
Since in this case (zjP M ) = 1; the above condition implies that (A9) is satis…ed whenever (A1) is satis…ed.
Case 2. z is such that 0 p then (A11) is trivially satis…ed. Note also that the same holds true for (A9) since, by construction, (zjP
for z 6 = q:
Next, suppose that p e q (z)+ 2 (p k 1 ; p k ) for some k: In which case, using V N (p)
On the other hand, using 
Substituting the above condition into (A13) yields:
Finally, suppose that p e q (z) + 2 [p k ; p k ] for some k: By proceeding in a similar way, we have:
Likewise, using
e q + and (A5), one can show:
As before, substituting the above condition into (A15) yields (A14). To complete the proof, note that (A11), (A12) and (A14), taken together, imply that (A9) is satis…ed whenever (A1) is satis…ed.
Lemma A3. Suppose that (A8) and (A9) are satis…ed for some q: Then, there always exists an equilibrium in which in some period on the equilibrium path …rms meet and produce the output q each.
Proof. Consider the following strategy M :
In period t = 0 propose to meet; produce q if the meeting has been held, otherwise produce q n and play from the next period onwards;
In period t = 1 play N if p 2 P N ; play M if p 2 P M ; and play otherwise.
If a …rm adheres to this strategy, it will obtain the expected payo¤:
In contrast, if it deviates by waiving the meeting, it will save on F e but obtain zero payo¤s in all the subsequent periods. Hence, it will refrain from doing so only if (A8) is satis…ed. If instead it deviates by producing an output z 6 = q; it will obtain the expected payo¤:
Hence, it will refrain from doing so only if (A9) is satis…ed.
Corollary A1. (A8) and (A9) are necessary and su¢ cient conditions for …rms to meet and produce the output q each in any period on the equilibrium path.
De…ne the set
where Since p is uniformly distributed on the interval P q ; the value of depends only on the sum of the lengths of the intervals P M 1 ; : : : ; P M s : Hence, (P M ) = ( e P M ): In contrast, the value of also depends on the location of these intervals. Speci…cally, we have:
we have (using (A5)):
which implies that (zj e
In the proof of Lemma A2 it was shown that a …rm might gain only from those output deviations in which it increases its output level. On the other hand, by Lemma A4, …rms can only increase the probability of detection of such deviations if they choose to meet when the price falls within the set e P M rather than when it falls within the set P M : This yields:
Corollary A2. In solving for the optimal collusive strategy, one can restrict attention to the set of prices triggering communication which has the form P M = [p 0 ; p]
we have (p; q) = (p p e q + ) while, using (A5), we have:
Note that since, for given and q; p is uniquely de…ned (i.e., p = 2 + p e q ); then the outcome in every single period on the equilibrium path can be characterized in terms of and q rather than p and q:
De…ne the function:
where b z( ; q) q + 2 (1 ): Using the expressions for (zj p; q) and b (zj ; q); one can verify:
(zj p; q)j p = 2 +p e q = minf1; b (zj ; q)g:
De…ne the functions:
Using the expressions for e (z; q) and b (zj ; q); one can verify:
Also, denote: 
Proof. In the proof of Lemma A2 it was shown that in considering (A9) it su¢ ces to restrict attention to z q: In which case, using (A16)-(A19), it is straightforward to verify that (A9) boils down to the following two conditions:
Since the choice sets in maximization problems (A20)-(A21) are larger than the respective choice sets in maximization problems (A18)-(A19), then g o (q)
G o (q) and g h ( ; q) G h ( ; q): Thus, any q satisfying (A22)-(A23) must necessarily satisfy (A24)-(A25).
To show that the opposite holds true, consider two cases.
Case 1. (A25) is stronger than (A24), i.e.,
Note that (A26) can be satis…ed only if @ z G h (b zj ; q) < 0: To show this, suppose, to the contrary, that @ z G h (b zj ; q) 0: This condition and condition (ii), taken together, imply that G h (zj ; q) is increasing on (q; b z) and, therefore, g h ( ; q) = G h (b zj ; q): In turn, this condition and conditions (iii) and (iv), taken together, imply that g h ( ; q) < g o (q) which violates (A26).
Next, the condition @ z G h (b zj ; q) < 0 and condition (i), taken together, imply that G h (zj ; q) is decreasing for all z > b z: Thus, G h ( ; q) = g h ( ; q) and, therefore, (A25) and (A23) are equivalent.
Suppose that @ z G o (b zj q) > 0: In this case, condition (i) implies that G o (zj q) is increasing for all z < b z: Thus, G o (q) = g o (q) and, therefore, (A24) and (A22) are equivalent.
Finally, suppose that
Thus, (A22) must be satis…ed whenever (A25) (alternatively, (A23)) is satis…ed.
Case 2. (A24) is stronger than (A25), i.e.,
Note that (A27) can be satis…ed only if @ z G o (b zj q) > 0: To show this, suppose, to the contrary, that @ z G o (b zj q) 0: In which case, since G o (zj q) is concave, it must be decreasing for all z > b z and, therefore, g o (q) = G o (b zj q): This condition and conditions (iii) and (iv), taken together, imply that g o (q) < g h ( ; q) which violates (A27).
As before, in case @ z G o (b zj q) > 0; we have G o (q) = g o (q) which implies that (A24) and (A22) are equivalent. Likewise, in case @ z G h (b zj ; q) < 0; we have G h ( ; q) = g h ( ; q) which implies that (A25) and (A23) are equivalent.
Finally, suppose that @ z G h (b zj ; q) 0: In this case, condition (i) implies that G h (zj ; q) must have a unique global maximal point at z h b z:
Thus, (A23) must be satis…ed whenever (A24) (alternatively, (A22)) is satis…ed.
and denote: ( ; q ) arg max In period t = 0 propose no meeting and produce q;
; p]; otherwise, play .
By construction, N ( ; q) yields the expected payo¤ V N ( ; q): By Lemma A3, N ( ; q) is an equilibrium strategy whenever ( ; q) satis…es (A9). In which case,
Consider the outcome ( N ; q N ) generated by N in period t = 0: By Lemma A5, it must satisfy (A22) and (A23). In which case, using the de…nition of ( ; q ); we must have
Next, consider the following strategy M ( ; q):
In period t = 0 propose to meet; produce q if the meeting has taken place, otherwise produce q n and play from the next period onwards;
In period t = 1 proceed as the strategy N ( ; q) requires to do from this period onwards.
By construction, M ( ; q) yields the expected payo¤ V M ( ; q) = V N ( ; q) (1 )F e : By Lemma A3, if ( ; q) satis…es (A8) and (A9) then M ( ; q) is an equilibrium strategy. In which case, V M ( ; q) 2 V M and, therefore, V M ( ; q) V M for all ( ; q) satisfying (A8) and (A9). Note that the set of outcomes ( ; q) satisfying (A8) and (A9) is at least as large as the set of outcomes ( ; q) satisfying (A9) only. Lemma A5 and the fact that (A8) is equivalent to V N ( ; q) (1 )F e 0 imply that the former set is non empty only if ( ; q ) satis…es (A8), i.e., V N ( ; q ) (1 )F e 0: In which case, using the de…nition of V M ; we must have
As before, consider the outcome ( M ; q M ) generated by M in period t = 0: By Lemma A2, ( M ; q M ) must satisfy (A8) and (A9). In which case, using the de…n-ition of ( ; q ); we must have
Using (A28), (A29) and (A30), it is straightforward to verify that Proof. Since ( ; q) (which is de…ned in the text) is an equilibrium strategy then e (q) F e 2 V N and therefore:
where V N = e (q ) F e ; by Lemma A6.
On the other hand, since the outcome path induced by ( ; q ) generates the expected payo¤s V N = e (q ) F e and V M = V N (1 )F e ; then ( ; q ) must satisfy (OD) and (HD). Given that ( ; q) solves (P1), we must then have:
Taken together, (A31) and (A32) imply that V N = e (q) F e :
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B. Proof of Proposition 3
Using the expressions for e (z; q) and e (q); one can verify:
In what follows, it will prove useful to write e (q) as (using Assumption 1):
Taken together, (B1) and (B2) 
which is equivalent to b min where b min is given by: 
which yields b q h q n 8 =(n + 1): In turn, this condition holds only for those 's which satisfy: 
C. Proof of Proposition 4
Since b
For a given F e ; de…ne the set b F as:
In the case = 2 b F the proof is given in the text. Thus, only the case 2 b F needs to be considered. In addition, since communication can enhance collusion only if it allows …rms to sustain the output q < b q h ; in what follows the analysis will be restricted to those values of q only.
In this case, the fact that (HD tc ) is binding for b q h ; in particular, implies that q must satisfy 2 (n + 1)(q n q) > e (q)=(1 ): Using this condition and replacing e (z; q) and V N by their expressions, the left hand side of (9) takes the form:
Since the above expression is strictly positive, (9) can be satis…ed only if its right hand side is also strictly positive, i.e., only if > 0 and e (q)
In which case, using the fact that (1 )F e e (b q h ) for any 2 b F ; one obtains e (q) F e > e (b q h ) for any ( ; q) satisfying (9) :
Using (B1) and (B2), g(q; ; n) can be written as:
For a given vector of model parameters ( ; F e ; ; n); de…ne the functions:
( ; q; ) g(q; ; n) F e ;
( ; q; ) 1 4 (n + 1)(q
By rearranging the terms, ( ; q; ) can be written as:
Using (B2) and (n 1)q n = 2 (n + 1)(1 b min )= b min ; b(q; ) can be written as:
Again, using (B2) and also m = ((n 1)q n ) 2 =4n; d(q; ) can be written as:
By construction, ( ; q) satis…es (OD) and (HD) if and only if it satis…es:
To prove the proposition, it su¢ ces to show that there exists a threshold F such that for F e F and 2 b F there always exists ( ; q) satisfying (C9) and (C10). Since (C9) can be satis…ed for any F e ; the necessarily condition for the threshold F to exist is that (C10) cannot be satis…ed for some F e > 0:
Using the expressions for ( ) and ( ); it is straightforward to verify that @ =@ < 0; @ =@ < 0; @ =@F e > 0 and @ =@F e > 0: The …rst two conditions, in particular, imply that if (C9) and (C10) are satis…ed for = inf b F = b min ; then a fortiori they will be satis…ed for any > b min (provided that the other parameters are held …xed). Thus, for the rest of the analysis it will assumed that = b min : Denote b ( b min ; F e ; ; n) and b (b ): Using (B3) and m = ((n 1)q n ) 2 =4n; one can verify:
Since ( ; q; b ) is a quadratic function of ; then, for given q and b ; (C10) can be satis…ed in the relevant range in which > 0 only if the equation ( ; q; b ) = 0 has real roots. In turn, this is possible only if:
which imply:
where ( ) 2 (1 + p 1 + 1= ): Using (C6), b(q; ) evaluated at = b min yields:
Substituting (C7) and (C13) into (C12) and rearranging the terms leads to (after dividing by n):
(
where x q n q and b
Since the left hand side of (C14) is a quadratic function of x; (C14) can be satis…ed in the relevant range in which x > 0 only if:
Using (C11), (C8) and (B3), the above condition can be written as:
De…ne T n as the solution to the following equation:
Since 0 ( ) > 0; then T n is unique and strictly positive. Using this, (C15) can be stated as b T n : Substituting (C11) into this condition and rearranging the terms yields F e b F where b F is given by:
The analysis thus implies that, for any 2 b F ; (C10) can be satis…ed only if By performing routine calculations, one can verify:
16nT n (n + 1) 2 (n 1)q n 2(n + 1) :
Note that, for (b ; b q) to be sustainable in equilibrium, it must also satisfy:
Since ( ) and ( ) are monotonic functions of F e (i.e., @ =@F e > 0 and @ =@F e > 0); it follows that F = b F if (C20) is satis…ed, and F < b F otherwise. Note that (C19), in particular, implies that b approaches in…nity, as tends to zero. In which case, (C20) cannot be satis…ed because g( ) is bounded from above. Thus, it must necessarily be F < b F for small enough. The following lemma states the conditions under which F = b F :
Lemma C1. (C20) is satis…ed for large enough and n 12:
Proof. Since b min ; b F and b are continuous functions of and n (as implied by (B3), (C17) and (C19), respectively), then the composite function (b ; b q; b min ; b F ; n) is continuous with respect to these variables. Thus, it su¢ ces to show that (C20) can be satis…ed for the maximal value of which is equal to q n here. In which case, by continuity, it will also be satis…ed for 's su¢ ciently close to q n : Substituting = q n into (C19) yields:
b j = q n = r T n 1 + T n 16nT n (n + 1) 2 (n 1) 2(n + 1) :
Note that (C16), taken with the fact that ( ) 0; implies that 16nT n =(n + 1) 2 < 1 and, therefore, b j = q n < 1: Using (B3), (C1), (C17) and (C18), one can verify:
g(b q; b min ; n) b F = q n = 2(n 1) (3n + 1) 1 (n 2 + 8n 1)T n (n + 1) 2 ;
which is lower than one. Substituting (C21) and (C22) into the expression for ( ) and rearranging the terms Using the above condition, (C20) evaluated at = q n takes the form:
16nT n (n + 1) 2 r T n 1 + T n 3n + 1 4(n + 1) + n 2 + 8n 1
Since ( ) is an increasing function while the fraction 16n=(n + 1) 2 decreases as n increases, then T n (de…ned by (C16)) must be an increasing function of n: From the condition (1 + ( ))j =1=8 < (n + 1) 2 =16n n=2 it follows that T 2 > 1=8: As a result, T n T 2 > 1=8 for all n 2: Next, since 0 ( ) > 0 and ( )j =1=8 = 1; then ( ) > 1 for all > 1=8: Taken together, this condition and T n > 1=8 imply that T n (1 + (T n )) > 2T n : In turn, this condition and the fact that T n satis…es (C16) imply that 16nT n =(n+1) 2 < 1=2: Finally, using the latter condition and T n =(1 + T n ) < 1; we have: Since '(n) is an increasing function and '(12) ' 0:98; (C23) is satis…ed for all n 12.
Lemma C2. b F m for large enough and n 12:
Proof. It su¢ ces to show that b F evaluated at the the maximal value of (which is equal to q n ) is strictly larger than m ; provided that n 12: In which case, by continuity, this will also hold true for 's su¢ ciently close to q n : Substituting = q n into (C17) yields:
Note that (1 + ( )) < 4 ( + 1=2) for all > 0: Taken together, this condition and (C16) imply that (n + 1) 2 =16n < 4T n (T n + 1=2): From the latter condition it 
Using ( Since (n) is a decreasing function and (12) ' 1:08; the conclusion follows.
D. Proof of Proposition 5
The proof proceeds by way of two lemmas.
Lemma D1. Explicit collusion cannot be sustained as tends to zero.
Proof. Any sustainable outcome ( ; q) must satisfy (OD) and (HD). Consider …rst (OD). Since the function e (q) F e is bounded from above, the left hand side of (OD) must approach zero, as tends to zero, which is possible only if q approaches q n :
Consider now (HD). First, let us show that the left hand side of (HD) must be strictly positive as tends to zero. Suppose, to the contrary, that it is not. In which case, for small enough (HD) boils down to the following two conditions: 
Since e (q n ) = 0; @ e (q n )=@q < 0 and > 0; (D2) can be satis…ed only if q < q n :
In turn, (D1) can be satis…ed only if the slope of the maximand in (D1) evaluated at z = 0 is non-positive. This yields (using (C6)): The above condition necessarily implies that q > q n for all < b min : Thus, (D1) and (D2) contradict each other.
In the proof of Proposition 4 it was established that, for a given = ( ; F e ; ; n);
(ND) can be satis…ed only if:
where ( ) = 2 (1 + p 1 + 1= ) while b(q; ); d(q; ) and ( ) are given by (C3), (C4) and (C5), respectively. Substituting (C6) and (C7) into (D3) yields (using that x = q n q): n x x ( ) ( ) x (+) ( ) x x ( ( )) nx + 2 (n + 1)
where x ( ) ( ) is given by (C8). By rearranging the terms and dividing by n; the above condition writes as:
where 2 ( ) 1 + ( ( )); 0 ( ) x (+) ( ) x ( ) ( ) and Taken together, the above conditions imply that for small enough (D4) approximates to: which cannot be satis…ed for x close enough to zero.
Thus, explicit collusion is not sustainable for small enough. On the other hand, it must be sustainable for large enough (since in this case tacit collusion is sustainable and, by Proposition 4, so is explicit one). Taken with the fact that (OD) and (HD) are monotonic in ; this implies that there must exist a threshold min 2 (0; b min ] such 43 that explicit collusion is sustainable if and only if min : Lemma D2. If F e < F ; then min < b min :
Proof. From Proposition 3 it follows that (HD tc ) is binding for = b min : By Proposition 4, there always exists ( ; q) satisfying (C9) and (C10) when = b min and F e = F : Note that the left hand sides of (C9) and (C10) are continuous functions of and decreasing functions of F e : Thus, for F e < F there must exist F > 0 such that for any 2 ( b min F ; b min ) both constraints are satis…ed for some ( ; q):
Figure 1: The probability as a function of and n given = 0:09 and F = 0:02: Figure 2 : The probability as a function of and given n = 4 and F = 0:02:
